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CLERK SUPREME COUfl 
UTAH 
PARTIES 
Both the Plaintiff in the trial court proceeding and the Appellant in the immediate 
appeal is Trillium USA, Inc. CTrillium"). Both the Defendant in the trial court 
proceeding and the Appellee in the immediate appeal is the Board of County 
Commissioners of Broward County, Florida ("Broward County"). There are no other 
parties, either to the trial court proceeding or the immediate appeal. 
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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(3)0) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether Florida law governs the parties dispute, either because the parties' 
contract contains a valid and enforceable choice of law provision mandating the 
application of Florida law, or because the pertinent conflict of laws analysis mandates that 
Florida law be applied. 
Whether the terms of a written contract form a valid and binding choice of law 
provision is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. See Nova Casualty Co. v. 
Able Construction, Inc., 983 P.2d 575, 577-78 (Utah 1999) ("Interpretation of the terms 
of a contact is a question of law. Thus, we accord the trial court's legal conclusions 
regarding the contract no deference and review them for correctness."). Whether the law 
of a foreign state is deemed to control under a conflict of laws analysis is a question of 
law and is reviewed for correctness. See American National Fire Ins. v. Farmers Ins. 
Exchange, 927 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1996) (reversing trial court's determination that Utah 
law controlled after conducting conflict of laws analysis, stating "[w]e review the trial 
court's conclusions of law for correctness, granting them no deference."). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Trillium's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, which addressed this precise issue. Record 
at 148. 
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II. Whether a Florida common law procedural rule regarding venue is sufficient to 
preclude a Utah Citizen from maintaining an action in the Utah Courts against a Florida 
defendant that has sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Utah. 
Whether a trial court properly granted a motion to dismiss is a question of law and 
is reviewed for correctness. Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996) ("The 
propriety of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss is a question of 
law that we review for correctness."). In addition, this issue also involves the 
interpretation and application of a statute which an appellate court reviews for 
correctness. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Utah 1998) ("Because a district 
court's interpretation of a statute is a legal question, we review its ruling for 
correctness."). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Trillium's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Record at 148. 
III. Whether a trial court may properly consider arguments not previously addressed 
by the parties and raised for the first time by way of a Reply Memorandum in considering 
whether to grant a motion to dismiss. 
Whether a trial court properly granted a motion to dismiss is a question of law and 
is reviewed for correctness. Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996) ("The 
propriety of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss is a question of 
law that we review for correctness."). 
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This issue was preserved in the trial court by Trillium's Motion to Strike 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum, which raised this precise issue. Record at 229. 
IV. Whether Utah's venue statutes mandate that an action brought against a county of 
a foreign state be tried exclusively in the county of that foreign state, thus mandating 
dismissal of any such action brought in the courts of Utah. 1 
Whether a trial court properly granted a motion to dismiss is a question of law and 
is reviewed for correctness. Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996) ("The 
propriety of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss is a question of 
law that we review for correctness."). In addition, this issue also involves the 
interpretation and application of a statute which an appellate court reviews for 
correctness. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.?d 1234, 1240 (Utah 1998) ("Because a district 
court's interpretation of a statute is a legal question, we review its ruling for 
correctness."). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Trillium's Motion to Strike 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum which sought in the alternative, permission to file its 
Supplemental Memorandum in Response to Inappropriate New Arguments Raised in 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum ("Supplemental Memorandum"). Record at 229-30. 
Trillium's Supplemental Memorandum was proffered to the trial court as Exhibit "A" to 
1 Assuming for purposes of argument, that the trial court could have properly considered 
Broward County's arguments relating to the applicability of Utah venue statutes. 
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Trillium's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply 
Memorandum. Record at 240-50. 
V. Whether principles of comity mandate that an action brought against a county of a 
foreign state be brought exclusively in the county of theit foreign state, thus mandating 
dismissal of any such action brought in the courts of Utah.2 
Whether a trial court properly granted a motion to dismiss is a question of law and 
is reviewed for correctness. Tiede v. State. 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996) ("The 
propriety of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss is a question of 
law that we review for correctness."). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Trillium's Motion to Strike 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum which sought in the alternative, permission to file its 
Supplemental Memorandum in Response to Inappropriate new Arguments Raised in 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum ("Supplemental Memorandum"). Record at 229-30. 
Trillium's Supplemental Memorandum was proffered to the trial court as Exhibit "A" to 
Trillium's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply 
Memorandum. Record at 240-50. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (1996): 
2 Assuming for purposes of argument, that the trial court could have properly considered 
Broward County's arguments relating to principles of comity. 
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It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the public 
interest demands the state provide its citizens with an effective means of 
redress against nonresident persons, who, through certain significant 
minimal contacts with this state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the 
state's protection. This legislative action is deemed necessary because of 
technological progress which has substantially increased the flow of 
commerce between the several states resulting in increased interaction 
between persons of this state and persons of other states. 
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to citizens of this 
state, should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident 
defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-3 (1996): 
An action against a county may be commenced and tried in such county, 
unless such action is brought by a county, in which case it may be 
commenced and tried in any county not a party thereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Trillium has alleged that Broward County has breached the parties' contract by 
wrongfully refusing to accept delivery of, and pay for, certain goods and services as 
contemplated in the parties' contract. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Trillium filed its Complaint in this matter on April 30, 1999, alleging that Broward 
County had breached its contractual obligations. Record at 1. On June 16, 1999, 
Broward County moved to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Record at 11. Trillium filed its Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on July 12, 1999. Record at 148. Broward County's 
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Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was filed on August 2, 
1999 ("August 2, 1999 Reply Memorandum"). Record at 165. On August 16, 1999, 
Trillium moved to strike Broward County's August 2, 1999 Reply Memorandum on the 
grounds that it improperly raised arguments that had not been previously addressed by the 
parties. Record at 229. In the alternative, Trillium sought permission from the trial court 
to file a memorandum which responded to those arguments that were newly raised in 
Broward County's August 2, 1999 Reply Memorandum. Record at 230. Trillium 
attached its Supplemental Memorandum in Response to Inappropriate New Arguments 
Raised by Defendant's Reply Memorandum as Exhibit "A" to its August 16, 1999 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply Memorandum. Record 
at 240. Broward County filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion Strike 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum on August 30, 1999 and Trillium filed its Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike on September 10, 1999. Record at 251; 
Record at 258. On December 1, 1999, the Honorable Judge Ronald E. Nehring 
disqualified himself from the case. Record at 271. The action was subsequently assigned 
to the Honorable Judge David Young on December 2, 1999. Record at 272. On 
December 29, 1999, counsel for Trillium filed a Notice to Submit with the trial court, 
informing the trial court that both Broward County's Motion to Dismiss and Trillium's 
Motion to Strike were fully briefed, that oral argument had been requested in both matters 
and that Trillium requested that oral argument be heard on both motions at the same 
hearing. Record at 278. On February 2, 2000, the trial court issued a Minute Entry 
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setting oral argument on Broward County's Motion to Dismiss for February 25, 2000. 
Record at 281. Oral argument was heard with respect to Broward County's Motion to 
Dismiss on February 25, 2000 at the conclusion of which, Judge Young granted Broward 
County's Motion. Record at 283. The Order of Dismissal was entered in this case on 
March 8, 2000. Record at 284. Trillium timely filed its Notice of Appeal on March 24, 
2000. Record at 288. 
C. Disposition Below 
Broward County's Motion to Dismiss was granted by the trial court. The Order of 
Dismissal was entered on March 8, 2000. Record at 284. 
Oral argument was not heard with respect to, and the trial court did not rule upon, 
Trillium's Motion to Strike. See Record at 281, 283, 284. 
D. Statement of Facts 
1. In August of 1995, Trillium entered into a contract with defendant and 
appellee, Board of County Commissioners of Broward County, Florida ("Broward 
County") to provide the parts and services necessary to convert certain of Broward 
County's vehicles to run on natural gas. Record at 2, f 6; 162, f 3. 
2. The contract entered into by the parties was the result of Broward County's 
unsolicited Invitation for Bid that was sent to and received by Trillium at its Utah 
location. Record at 162 Tf 4. 
3. The contents of the Invitation for Bid were pre-printed and not negotiated 
by the parties. Record at 162, f 7. 
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4. Included within the Invitation for Bid was a provision entitled "Legal 
Requirements" which provided: 
Applicable provisions of all Federal, State, County and local laws, and of 
all ordinance, rules and regulations including the Procurement of Broward 
County shall govern development, submittal and evaluation of bids received 
in response hereto and shall govern any and all claims and disputes which 
may arise between person(s) submitting a bid in response hereto and 
Broward County by and through its officers, employees and authorized 
representatives, or any other person natural or otherwise. Lack of 
knowledge by any bidder shall not constitute a recognizable defense against 
the legal effect thereof. 
Record at 77, ^  22. 
5. Trillium completed the Invitation for Bid at its Utah location and caused the 
same to be returned to Broward County. Record at 162, <[ 5. 
6. No further contract negotiations of any substance were had between the 
parties. Record at 162, % 6. 
7. Trillium's Bid was accepted by Broward County on August 15, 1995 and 
Trillium subsequently began performance of its obligations under the contract. Record at 
I62,1f3. 
8. On April 30, 1999, Trillium filed the immediate action in the Third Judicial 
District Court for the County of Salt Lake, Utah, alleging that Broward County had 
breached the parties' contract and damaged Trillium in the amount of $29,017.00, 
exclusive of court costs, interest and attorney's fees. Record at 1-5. 
9. On June 16, 1999, Broward County, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, moved the trial court to dismiss the action, alleging: (1) 
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pursuant to the "Legal Requirements" provision in the Invitation for Bid, the parties had 
expressly agreed that the contract at issue would be governed exclusively by Florida law; 
(2) Florida law would govern the dispute even if the parties had not so agreed; and (3) a 
Florida common law rule regarding venue of actions brought against Florida counties 
mandated that any and all suits against Broward County must be maintained exclusively 
in Florida state courts located within Broward County. Record at 11-22. 
10. Trillium filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss on July 12, 1999, contending that Trillium was entitled to its choice of venue as: 
(1) the "Legal Requirements" provision included in the pre-printed and non-negotiated 
Invitation for Bid did not constitute a valid choice of law provision mandating that 
Florida law be applied; (2) under applicable choice of law principles, Utah law properly 
governed the parties' dispute; and (3) even were Florida law deemed to govern the parties 
dispute, Trillium was entitled to maintain the action in the Utah courts as the Florida 
common law rule regarding venue was inherently procedural in nature, in direct conflict 
with well established public policies of the state of Utah, and inapplicable outside of the 
boundaries of Florida itself. Record at 148-59. 
11. In its Reply Memorandum filed on August 2, 1999, Broward County argued 
for the first time that: (1) Utah venue provisions mandated that the action be tried in the 
courts of Broward County and (2) principles of comity mandated dismissal of the action. 
Record at 165-73. 
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12. On August 16, 1999, Trillium moved to strike Broward County's August 2, 
1999 Reply Memorandum on the grounds that it improperly raised new arguments and 
issues in contravention of established Utah law. Record at 229. 
13. In the alternative to its Motion to Strike, Trillium requested permission to 
file a Supplemental Memorandum to address the new issues and arguments raised by 
Broward County in its August 2, 1999 Reply Memorandum. Record at 230. Trillium 
appended its Supplemental Memorandum in Response to Inappropriate new Arguments 
Raised in Defendant's Reply Memorandum as Exhibit "A" to Trillium's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply Memorandum. Record at 240-50. 
14. On December 2, 1999, the action was reassigned from the Honorable Judge 
Ronald E. Nehring to the Honorable Judge David. S. Young. Record at 272. 
15. On December 29, 1999, counsel for Trillium filed a Notice to Submit with 
the trial court, informing the trial court that both Broward County's Motion to Dismiss 
and Trillium's Motion to Strike were fully briefed, that oral argument had been requested 
in both matters and that Trillium requested that oral argument be heard on both motions at 
the same hearing. Record at 278-79. 
16. Oral argument was heard with respect to Broward County's Motion to 
Dismiss on February 25, 2000. Record at 283. 
17. During the course of the February 25, 2000 oral argument, Judge David S. 
Young admitted that he had failed to read all of the briefs and other materials submitted to 
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the court relating to the motions then pending before the court. Record at 302, p. 5, 17-
20. 
18. At the conclusion of the February 25, 2000 hearing, Judge David S. Young 
summarily granted Broward County's Motion to Dismiss, despite the fact that he had not 
read all of the pleadings filed with the Court. Record at 302, p. 5, 17-20; Record at 302, 
p. 25, 7-11. 
19. The Order of Dismissal was entered by the trial court on March 8, 2000. 
Record at 284-5. 
20. Trillium timely filed its Notice of Appeal on March 24, 2000. Record at 
288. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. Florida law does not govern the dispute between the parties. First, the parties' 
contract does not contain a choice of law provision mandating that Florida law govern 
any disputes between the parties. Nowhere in the clause at issue is the state of Florida 
even mentioned. Further, the clause at issue, which was drafted exclusively by Broward 
County, cannot reasonably be construed to imply that the parties mutually agreed that 
Florida law would exclusively govern disputes between the parties. 
Neither does the pertinent conflict of laws analysis require that Florida law be 
applied to the parties' dispute. To the contrary, the majority of factors that must be 
applied in any conflict of laws analysis favor the application of Utah law. 
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II. Even were Florida law deemed to govern the present dispute (which it does not), 
Broward County would, nonetheless, properly be subject to suit in the courts of Utah. 
Under well established rules regarding conflict of laws, even when the substantive law of 
another state is deemed to govern the merits of a dispute, the procedural law of the 
foreign state, such as the manner and method of bringing an action, remains wholly 
inapplicable. The United States Supreme Court itself has held that statutes and rules 
regarding venue are procedural in nature. Accordingly, even if Florida substantive law 
applies to the immediate case, Florida procedural law, including any purported provisions 
regarding venue, simply does not apply. 
Further, any application of Florida law which serves to preclude an unwitting Utah 
citizen, injured by a nonresident with sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Utah, 
from maintaining an action in the State of Utah would run directly contrary to the explicit 
public policies of this state and is therefore of no effect. 
Further yet, the Florida common law rules regarding venue are totally inapplicable 
outside of the state of Florida. Broward County failed to cite a single case in which the 
Florida common law rule at issue was deemed to bar an action brought outside of Florida. 
Nor did a search on the part of Trillium uncover any such case. The Florida venue rules 
at issue are merely an intrastate housekeeping provision, inapplicable outside of the 
state's own boundaries. 
III. Broward County's arguments pertaining to both the applicability of Utah venue 
statutes and principles of comity were not properly before the trial court and therefore 
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could not, or should not, have been considered by the trial court in its determination as to 
whether the action should be dismissed. Neither the applicability of Utah venue statutes 
nor comity principles were in any way addressed by the parties prior to Broward County's 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Well established 
Utah law specifically limits a reply memorandum to the rebutting of matters set forth in 
the respective opposition memorandum. Accordingly, those arguments, newly raised in 
Broward County's August 2, 1999 Reply Memorandum, were not properly before the trial 
court and should have been disregarded in their entirety. 
IV. Utah statutes regarding venue do not mandate dismissal of this action. The Utah 
venue statute that Broward County has previously cited has application only to those suits 
brought against Utah counties in the st^te of Utah. The statute has no application to suits 
against Utah counties brought outside of the state of Utah, nor does it apply to suits 
against counties of other states brought in the courts of Utah. 
V. Principles of comity do not preclude the present action. The case reporters are 
replete with examples of actions in which counties and other municipal corporations have 
been held subject to suit in foreign states. Those relatively few cases in which courts 
have determined that foreign states or their subdivisions were improperly sued outside of 
their respective home state and county, hinge largely upon unique factual circumstances, 
none of which are present here. Further, a determination that foreign counties are 
immune from suit in the courts of Utah would be diametrically opposed to important 
public policies set forth by Utah statute. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. FLORIDA LAW DOES NOT GOVERN OR CONTROL THE PARTIES 
DISPUTE 
A. The Parties' Contract Does Not Contain a Choice of Law Provision 
Mandating Application of Florida Law 
The contract between the parties does not contain a choice of law provision 
mandating application of Florida law. The contractual provision identified by Broward 
County as purported evidence of the parties' express mutual assent to exclusively apply 
Florida law merely states: 
Applicable provisions of all Federal, State, County and local laws, and of 
all ordinance, rules and regulations including the Procurement of Broward 
County shall govern development, submittal and evaluation of bids received 
in response hereto and shall govern any and all claims and disputes which 
may arise between person(s) submitting a bid in response hereto and 
Broward County by and through its officers, employees and authorized 
representatives, or any other person natural or otherwise. Lack of 
knowledge by any bidder shall not constitute a recognizable defense against 
the legal effect thereof. 
Record at 77, Tf 22. 
A purported choice of law clause will only be enforced where it is "established to 
the satisfaction of the forum that the parties have chosen the state of the applicable law." 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 cmt. a (1971). Further, "[wjhen the 
parties have made such a choice, they will usually refer expressly to the state of the 
chosen law in their contract, and this is the best way of insuring that their desires will be 
given effect." Id. (emphasis added). It is also axiomatic that where the terms of a 
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contract are ambiguous, such ambiguity will be strictly construed against the drafter. 
Zions First Nat. Bk. v. National Am. Title Ins.. 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988). 
As evidenced by its plain terms, the provision at issue fails to so much as even 
reference "Florida." Even giving the provision the most generous of interpretations, the 
clause, in simple terms, says nothing more than, "all applicable law will be applied." It 
simply does not state, either expressly or implicitly, that the parties have agreed that the 
law of Florida will exclusively govern any dispute arising from the contract. Certainly, 
Trillium never understood the contract to contain such a choice of law provision. Record 
at 162, f 9. As the sole and exclusive drafter of the provision at issued Broward County 
easily could have included appropriate language expressly providing for a choice of law 
provision.-* Broward County's failure Jo do so precludes any assertion that the clause in 
dispute constitutes a valid and enforceable choice of law provision. See generally Zions, 
749 P.2d at 654 (holding that failure of drafting party to include appropriate language 
specifically spelling out the interpretation urged at court by drafting party mandated that 
provision's ambiguity be strictly construed against drafter). 
3
 Record at 162, ffl[ 7-8. 
4 It is interesting to note that elsewhere within the same Invitation to Bid, Broward 
County specifically designated Florida as the controlling authority with respect to 
particular contract provisions. For example, with respect to the requirement of Workers' 
Compensation Insurance, Broward County specifically designated "the State of Florida" 
as the applicable authority. Record at 80, % 6.1. 
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B. Conflict of Law Rules Dictate That Utah law Governs the Parties' Dispute 
Where, as here, the parties have failed to make an effective choice of law, the court 
determines which substantive state law will govern. American Nat. Fire v. Farmers Ins.. 
927 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1996). In making this determination, the Utah courts have 
adopted the "most significant relationship" test as set forth in Section 188 of the Second 
Restatement of Conflict of Laws. Id With respect to disputes arising out of contract, the 
relevant factors to be considered are: (1) the place of contracting; (2) the place of 
negotiation; (3) the place of performance; (4) the location of the subject matter of the 
contract; and (5) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of 
business of the parties. Id.; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188 (1971). 
Application of the relevant factQrs to the present dispute evidences that Utah law, 
not Florida law, properly governs the dispute between the parties. According to the 
Restatement, place of contracting is determined according to the place where the last act 
necessary to give the contract binding effect occurred. Restatement (Second) of Conflict 
of Laws § 188 cmt. e (1971). Admittedly, this last act occurred in Florida upon 
defendant's acceptance of plaintiff s offer. However, as stated in the Restatement, "the 
place of contracting is a relatively insignificant contact." Id, The second factor, place of 
negotiation, is neutral. No negotiation of any substance or terms ever occurred between 
the parties. Record at 162, f^ 6. Broward County provided Trillium with the pre-printed 
Invitation for Bid and Trillium caused the Invitation for Bid to be completed and 
returned. Record at 162, fflf 4-5. No further negotiation occurred. Record at 162, Tf 6. 
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The third factor, place of performance, favors Trillium. Indeed, the vast majority of work 
performed by Trillium under the contract occurred outside of the boundaries of Florida, 
and more particularly in the state of Utah. Record at 162, f 10. The actual vehicle 
modification occurring in Florida comprised a relatively insignificant portion of the 
overall work performed by plaintiff. Record at 163, f 10. The fourth factor, location of 
subject matter, also favors Trillium as the relevant inquiry is not where the goods in 
question ultimately ended up but rather where the goods originated. See Rocky Mountain 
Helicopters v. Bell Helicopter, 24 F.3d 125, 129 (10 th Cir. 1994) (applying Utah rules 
regarding conflict of laws and holding that Texas law applied because the subject matter 
of the contract, a helicopter, originated in Texas). Most, if not all, of the parts and 
components furnished to the defendant were gathered, assembled and shipped from 
outside of Florida. Record at 163, If 11. The last factor, location of the parties is entirely 
neutral. In sum, only place of contracting, a factor deemed by the Restatement as 
insignificant, favors Broward County. Accordingly, the choice of law factors favor 
application of Utah law, not Florida law. 
II. EVEN IF FLORIDA LAW APPLIED, DEFENDANT WOULD STILL BE 
AMENABLE TO SUIT IN THE UTAH COURTS 
Even assuming for the sake of argument that Florida law properly applied to the 
immediate action (which it does not), Broward County is still amenable to suit in the Utah 
courts. Well established rules regarding conflicts of law mandate that even where the 
substantive law of another state is deemed to control, the procedural law of the foreign 
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state, including rules regarding venue, are to be disregarded. Further, foreign provisions 
of law which purport to preclude Utah citizens from maintaining an action in the Utah 
courts against nonresidents with sufficient minimum contacts directly violates established 
Utah public policies and hence are inapplicable. Lastly, the Florida venue provision at 
issue is simply inapplicable to actions brought outside of the state of Florida. Broward 
County has failed to cite a single case in which the venue provision at issue had been held 
to bar an action brought outside of the state of Florida. 
A. The Florida Common Law Rule Regarding Venue is Procedural in Nature 
and Thus Inapplicable 
Under well established Utah law, even where the law of another state is deemed to 
be applicable and controlling, the procedural law of that state, including those provisions 
regarding the manner and method of bringing suit, is to be disregarded. Morris v. Svkes, 
624 P.2d 681, 685 & n.3 (Utah 1981) ("it is our duty to apply the substantive law of [the 
foreign state] to this controversy. Matters of procedure in a contract action are, of course, 
governed by the law of the forum."); Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 870 & n.14 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that while another state's substantive law applied to action, other 
state's statute of limitations was inapplicable as was procedural law); Financial Bancorp 
v. Pingree and Dahle, Inc., 880 P.2d 14, 16 & n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("The general rule 
of lex fori requires that matters of procedure be governed by the law of the forum, 
regardless of the parties' domicile, the law of the state in which the wrong was 
committed, or where the contract was made or breached. . . . The lex fori rule applies 
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regardless of a contract's choice of law provision selecting another state's law unless the 
contract expressly provides for application of that state's [matter of procedure]."). The 
distinction between substantive and procedural law has been defined as thus: 
Uniformly, the substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines 
and regulates rights; whereas the adjective, remedial or procedural law is 
that which prescribes the method of enforcing the right or obtaining redress 
for its invasion. It is often said the adjective law pertains to and prescribes 
the practice, method, procedure or legal machinery by which the substantive 
law is enforced or made effective. 
State v. Birmingham. 392 P.2d 775, 776 (Ariz. 1964). See also American Nat. Fire v. 
Farmers Ins.. 927 P.2d 186, 189 (Utah 1996) (defining procedural law as those rules not 
relating to "the substantive content of the contract or the rights of the parties to 
damages."); Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543, 544 (Or. 1964) ("What is a matter of 
substance and what is a matter of procedure are sometimes difficult questions to decide. 
Stumberg states the distinction as follows: 'procedural rules should be classified as those 
which concern methods of presenting to a court the operative facts upon which legal 
relations depend; substantive rules those which concern the legal effect of those facts 
after they have been established.'") (internal citation omitted) (cited with approval by 
Utah Supreme Court in Morris v. Svkes, 624 P.2d 681, 685 n.3 (Utah 1981)). 
Critically, as the United States Supreme Court has held, rules regarding venue are 
"wholly procedural" and not substantive. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad v. 
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 563 (1967) (holding that amendment to 
venue provision was to be applied retroactively as venue provision was "wholly 
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procedural" not affecting "the substantive law applicable to the lawsuit." Further stating, 
"No one has a vested right in any given mode of procedure.") See also Moore v. Agency 
for Intern. Development, 994 F.2d 874, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that venue 
provisions are procedural and not substantive) (citing Denver and Rio Grande Western 
Railroad, 387 U.S. at 563.). Venue provisions merely pertain to the legal machinery by 
which the substantive law is enforced or made effective. Venue provisions do not go to 
the merits of an action. 
Despite this controlling authority, Broward County asserts that dismissal is proper 
because a Florida common law principle of venue purportedly allows a Florida county to 
choose^ to be immune from suit anywhere but in its home county. Such common law 
rules, however, go not to the merits of a dispute but merely serve to set forth the manner 
and method of bringing an action. Therefore, the Florida venue provision is procedural, 
not substantive. Accordingly, even were Florida substantive law applicable, Broward 
County would still be amenable to suit in the courts of this state. 
5 The Florida common law venue provision may be waived. E.g., Mansfield v. 
Singletarv, 610 So.2d 76, 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). 
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B. The Florida Venue Rules at Issue Are Inapplicable as They Directly 
Conflict with Well Established Public Policies of the State of Utah 
The Florida common law yenue rules directly conflict with fundamental public 
policies of the state of Utah and thus are inapplicable. The Utah state legislature has, by 
statute, stated: 
[that it is] a matter of legislative determination, that the public interest 
demands the state provide its citizens with an effective means of redress 
against nonresident persons, who through certain minimal contacts with this 
state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection. 
The provisions of [the long arm] act, to ensure maximum protection to 
citizens of this state, should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over 
nonresident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (1996). As evidenced by the above passage, it is the express 
public policy of the state of Utah that its citizens be guaranteed the right to bring an 
action against nonresidents in the Utah courts. Clearly, the possibility of bringing an 
action in the nonresident's home state was deemed to be wholly inadequate by the 
legislature. 
In essence, Broward County urges this court to find that a common law procedural 
rule of Florida abrogates fundamental rights guaranteed by the state of Utah to its 
citizens. Such a finding, however, is impermissible. Only by a conscious and willful 
waiver of the Utah citizen itself, may the right to bring an action within the Utah courts be 
stripped away. Such a waiver did not occur here. To the extent that Florida common law 
serves to prevent a Utah citizen from maintaining an action in state court it is in direct 
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conflict with the public policies and statutes of the state of Utah and properly should be 
disregarded. 
C. The Florida Venue Provision is Inapplicable to Actions Brought Outside the 
State of Florida 
The Florida common law rules regarding venue with respect to actions brought 
against Florida counties are entirely inapplicable to actions brought outside of the 
boundaries of the state of Florida. Broward County failed to cite a single case in which 
the venue rules at issue have served to bar an action brought outside of Florida. Nor did 
Trillium uncover such a case. As evidenced by those cases cited by Broward County, the 
venue provision at issue is an intrastate house keeping rule applied exclusively by the 
Florida courts to actions arising in the Florida court system. Nothing in the cases cited by 
Broward County even intimates that the Florida common law venue rule has been, or 
should be, applied outside of the Florida court system. 
III. DEFENDANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IMPERMISSIBLY RAISED 
NEW ISSUES AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISREGARDED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT 
Broward County's August 2, 1999 Reply Memorandum raised issues addressed 
neither in Broward County's initial Memorandum in Support nor in Trillium's 
Memorandum in Opposition and therefore should have been disregarded in its entirety. 
Well established Utah law mandates that every reply memorandum must be limited in 
scope to rebutting the matters proffered in the respective opposition memorandum. State 
v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 701 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Maack v. Resource Design & 
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Const,, Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 575 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v. Phathammavong, 860 
P.2d 1001, 1003-004 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Further, "the rule is well settled that the court 
will not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief." Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 
701 n.8 (quoting Phathammavong, 860 P.2d at 1005)); Maack, 875 P.2d at 575 n.3 
(same); Phathammavong, 860 P.2d at 1004 (quoting White v. Kent Medical Ctr. Inc., 810 
P.2d 4, 8 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)). As stated in Phathammavong: 
It is the responsibility of the moving party to raise in its . . . motion all of 
the issues on which it believes it is entitled to [prevail]. Allowing the 
moving party to raise new issues in its rebuttal materials is improper 
because the nonmovingparty has no opportunity to respond." 
860 P.2d at 1003-04 (alterations and emphasis in original) (quoting White v. Kent 
Medical Ctr. Inc., 810 P.2d 4, 8 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)). Claims that new arguments set 
forth in a reply memorandum are actually inherent or implicit in the original motion and 
memorandum are completely unavailing. R.D. Merrill Co. v. Pollution Control Bd„ 969 
P.2d 458, 473 n.10 (Wash. 1999) ("A party responding to a . . . motion should not have to 
guess what additional issues may be 'inherent' in the motion.") Nor does the fact that 
counsel may not have contemplated new arguments prior to receiving an opposition 
memorandum serve to excuse the inclusion of new arguments. White v. Kent Medical 
Ctr. Inc., 810 P.2d 4, 8 n.l (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). 
Broward County's Motion to Dismiss, as evidenced by Broward County's initial 
Memorandum in Support, was premised solely upon the contention that the parties and 
the Utah courts were, as a matter of law, bound by a particular Florida common law 
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provision regarding venue. Record at 20-22. Trillium's Memorandum in Opposition 
responded to that argument. Trillium directed the trial court's attention to the fact that the 
Florida common law provision put at issue by Broward County was wholly procedural 
and thus, according to well established rules regarding conflicts of law, of no effect upon 
the Utah courts. Record at 154-57. Trillium further noted that application of the 
particular provision at issue would be in direct contravention of the important public 
policies of the state of Utah as set forth in statute by the Utah legislature and was merely 
an intrastate rule without effect beyond the borders of Florida. Record at 157-59. 
Conceding defeat on the merits of its Memorandum in Support, Broward County's 
August 2, 1999 Reply Memorandum made no attempt to rebut the matters raised in 
Trillium's Memorandum in Opposition, rather Broward County attempted, 
impermissibly, to proffer two completely new arguments for dismissal. Broward County 
belatedly contended that Utah venue statute themselves commanded dismissal. Record at 
166-67. Further, Broward County asserted for the first time that principles of comity 
precluded the Utah courts from exerting jurisdiction over it. Record at 167-73. Both 
arguments were, and are, in error, but of perhaps more importance is the fact that 
Broward County was strictly foreclosed from even making those arguments at that 
juncture in the proceedings. 
Broward County's violation of well established Utah law prohibiting the raising of 
new issues by way of a reply memorandum was exacerbated by the fact the Honorable 
Judge David S. Young admittedly failed to read all of the briefs and other materials 
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submitted to the trial court with respect to those motions pending before it prior to 
granting Broward County's Motion to Dismiss. Record at 302, p.5, 17-20. As Trillium's 
Supplemental Memorandum was attached to the last pleading filed with the trial court 
prior to the hearing on Broward County's Motion to Dismiss, it appears possible, perhaps 
even likely, that the trial court based its decision to dismiss the action, at least in part, 
upon those arguments newly and inappropriately raised by Broward County without even 
considering Trillium's response to such arguments. Indeed, Judge Young indicated at the 
virtual beginning of the February 25, 2000 hearing that he had, in essence, already 
decided to dismiss the action, this despite his admitted failure to even read all of the 
pleadings filed with the trial court. Record at 302, p. 3-4, 5. 
Well established Utah law man4ates that a reply memorandum be restricted to the 
rebuttal of matters raised in the respective memorandum in opposition. Broward 
County's August 2, 1999 Reply Memorandum blatantly disregarded this command and 
raised new arguments for which Trillium was unable to properly respond. Accordingly, 
the trial court should have disregarded Broward County's August 2, 1999 Reply 
Memorandum in its entirety. 
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IV. UTAH VENUE STATUTES HAVE NO APPLICATION TO THE PRESENT 
SUIT6 
Utah statutes relating to venue of actions involving counties and other municipal 
corporations are not applicable to the present action. Specifically, section 78-13-3,7 
dealing with venue of actions involving counties, is strictly limited in scope to actions 
involving Utah counties, brought in Utah courts. Of Hansford v. District of Columbia. 
617 A.2d 1057, 1061-62 (Md. 1993) (Rejecting contention that Maryland venue statute 
had application to suit against District of Columbia brought in Maryland courts, stating "a 
Maryland municipality, sued in a Maryland court in a transitory action, should be sued 
where it is situated. The District of Columbia is not a Maryland municipal corporation 
and is not situated in a Maryland county. In the context of this case, it is a nonresident 
corporate defendant."). Section 78-13-3 does not bar actions against Utah counties from 
being brought outside of the state of Utah. Nor does the provision preclude actions 
against foreign counties from being brought in Utah courts. Broward County failed to 
cite any authority for the contrary proposition. Further, whether a county or other form of 
municipality may be properly subjected to suit outside of its home county and state is a 
question of jurisdiction, not venue. Annotation, Right to Lay Venue of Action Against 
6 Assuming for purposes of argument, that the trial court could have properly considered 
Broward County's arguments relating to the applicability of Utah venue statutes. 
7 "An action against a county may be commenced and tried in such county, unless such 
action is brought by a county, in which case it may be commenced and tried in any county 
not a party thereto." Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-3 (1996). 
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Municipality in County Other than that in Which it is Situated, 93 A.L.R. 500, 509 (1934) 
("the question whether a municipality can be sued in a state other than that of its situs 
would appear to be one of jurisdiction rather than venue... ."). Accordingly, section 78-
13-3 does not bar the present suit. 
V. PRINCIPLES Oi COMITY DO NOT SERVE TO PRECLUDE THE 
PRESENT SUIT8 
Principles of comity do not serve to prevent Trillium from maintaining this action 
against Broward County in the courts of Utah. Contrary, to Broward County's assertions, 
the vast majority of courts^ that have considered the issue have not found the exercise of 
jurisdiction over foreign states and their subdivisions to be improper under principles of 
comity. 10 The relatively few instances in which courts have declined to exercise such 
8 Assuming for purposes of argument, that the trial court could have properly considered 
Broward County's arguments relating to principles of comity. 
9
 R&, Hansford v. District of Columbia, 617 A.2d 1057, 1062 (Md. 1993) ("We agree 
with the majority of jurisdictions which today reject the notion that a municipal 
corporation is exempt from the venue principles governing other corporations."). 
10 The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples in which it was determined that the 
exercise of jurisdiction over foreign states or their subdivisions was proper: Nevada v. 
Hall 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (upholding decision which rejected claim that Nevada statutory 
provisions regarding venue and liability limitations should be observed in suit brought in 
California); Biscoe v. Arlington County, 738 F.2d 1352, 1358-60 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(rejecting County's contention that it should be immune from suit under principles of 
comity); Skipper v. Prince George's County, 637 F.Supp. 638, 639-41 (D.D.C. 1986) 
(rejecting contention that venue for action against county was improper in D.C. court); 
Peterson v. Sate of Texas, 635 P.2d 241, 243 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that "there is 
no immunity, by law or as a matter of comity, covering a sister state [for harm caused 
Colorado citizens]"); Kent County v. Shepherd, 713 A.2d 290, 298-300 (Del. 1998) 
(holding that public policy as evinced by state long arm act precluded claim that foreign 
(footnote continued on next page) 
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jurisdiction have, as a general rule, been dependent upon the presence of unusual 
circumstances, none of which are present here. 
The United States Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that there is no 
constitutional impediment to a foreign state or its subdivision being sued in the courts of a 
sister state. Nevada v. Hall 440 U.S. 410 (1978). A state may, however, accord a sister 
state and its subdivisions immunity from suit as a matter of comity. Id. at 426. In 
determining whether to extend comity, "[o]f primary importance is whether the public 
policies of the forum state would be contravened if comity were extended." Jackett v. 
L.A. Dept. of Water and Power, 771 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). All other 
considerations are ancillary. Id While the extension of comity calls for an exercise of 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
county and state should only be sued in home county); Streubin v. Iowa. 322 N.W.2d 84, 
87 (Iowa 1982) (holding that state's interest in protecting citizens outweighed Illinois's 
interests in limiting liability); Hillhouse v. City of Kansas City, 559 P.2d 1148, 1151(Kan. 
1977) ("Today there is no sound reason why a foreign municipal corporation should be 
treated any differently than foreign private corporations."); Hansford v. District of 
Columbia, 617 A.2d 1057, 1062 (Md. Ct. App. 1993) ("We agree with the majority of 
jurisdictions which today reject the notion that a [foreign] municipal corporation is 
exempt from the venue principles governing other corporations."); Wendt v. County of 
Osceola. Iowa, 289 N.W.2d 67, 69-70 (Minn. 1979) (holding that state's interests in 
protecting its citizens precluded county's assertion that it could not be sued outside of 
home county); Hernandez v. City of Salt Lake. 686 P.2d 251, 253 (Nev. 1984) ("The City 
of Salt Lake also argues that it should be immune from suit by citizens of this state in our 
courts because its statutes would protect it from suit in Utah. We decline to grant the city 
such protection in our courts."); Mianecki v. Second Judicial District Court, 658 P.2d 
422, 424-25 (Nev. 1983) (holding that state's interest in protecting its citizens mandated 
that jurisdiction be exercised over state of Wisconsin); Ehrlich-Bober & Co., Inc. v. 
University of Houston, 404 N.E.2d 726, 730 (N.Y. 1980) (rejecting claims that Texas 
venue provisions should be given effect under principles of comity). 
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judicial discretion, the legislature may, by statutory enactment, remove an issue from the 
realm of comity and judicial discretion. Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142, 1146 
(Utah 1991). 
The Utah legislature has, by statutory enactment, set forth important public 
policies which preclude the extension of comity under the present circumstances. The 
Utah legislature has, by statute, stated: 
[that it is] a matter of legislative determination, that the public interest 
demands the state provide its citizens with an effective means of redress 
against nonresident persons, who through certain minimal contacts with this 
state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection. 
The provisions of [the long arm] act, to ensure maximum protection to 
citizens of this state, should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over 
nonresident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (1996). Inherent in the long arm statute is the purposeful 
determination that the availability of redress in the non resident's home state is wholly 
insufficient. Id See also Kent County v. Shepherd, 713 A.2d 290, 300 (Del. 1998) 
(holding that Delaware long arm statute "was intended to 'avoid the necessity of 
following a tortfeasor to his [or her] place of domicile in order to obtain redress for his [or 
her] tort.'") (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). The public policies 
encapsulated in the long arm statute are of such paramount importance that the Utah 
Supreme Court has decreed that the Utah courts "must" exercise jurisdiction over non 
residents to the outermost limits of the Constitution. Starways. Inc. v. Curry, 980 P.2d 
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204, 206 (Utah 1999); Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 
1985). 
In stark contrast to the important public policies inherent in the Utah long arm 
statute, venue provisions (such as the Florida provision at issue) which purport to limit 
where states or their subdivisions may be sued are enacted merely "to serve the 
administrative convenience of the state." Ehrlich-Bober & Co., Inc. v. University of 
Houston, 404 N.E.2d 726, 730 (N.Y, 1980) (rejecting claims that Texas venue provisions 
should be given effect under principles of comity). See also Hillhouse v. City of Kansas 
City, 559 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Kan. 1977) ("We have concluded that the rule which 
establishes a special privilege in favor of foreign municipal corporations so as to exempt 
them from suit in the court of Kansas i? not in harmony with modern conditions nor does 
it meet the demands of justice in our present society."). A state's interests in adherence to 
venue restrictions are even weaker where the cause of action arises out of a commercial 
transaction. Ehrlich-Bober, 404 N.E.2d at 731. 
In short, the important public policies encompassed within the Utah long arm 
Statute prohibit the court from giving effect, as a matter of comity, to the venue and 
immunity arguments urged by Broward County. C£ Kent County, 713 A.2d at 301 
("The Delaware Long-Arm Statute . . . reflect a coherent and comprehensive public 
policy which prohibits a Delaware Court from recognizing, as a matter of comity, either 
the absolute or the limited sovereign immunity arguments that have been asserted. . . ."). 
Such a conclusion is wholly consonant with the commands of the Utah Supreme Court 
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and the Utah long arm statute which mandate that Utah courts exercise jurisdiction over 
non residents to the full limits of the Constitution. Moreover, by enacting the Utah long 
arm statute and its attendant statement of purpose, the Utah legislature has removed from 
the Utah courts discretion to grant immunity to a foreign state or its subdivision under 
principles of comity. 
A contrary result is not mandated by the authority previously cited by Broward 
County. Those courts which have, under principles of comity, granted effect to a foreign 
state's request of immunity have done so in large part under circumstances not present 
here. It is certainly true that in Jackett v. L.A. Dept. of Water & Power, relied upon 
extensively by Broward County, immunity was granted as a matter of comity. 771 P.2d 
1074 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). However, pven a cursory examination of the facts underlying 
the decision reveals the fallacy of Broward County's reliance upon the decision. First and 
foremost, the plaintiff in Jackett was a California resident, not a Utah citizen. Id. at 1077. 
Thus, the important public policies underlying the Utah long arm statute were completely 
inapplicable in Jackett. Further, the Jackett plaintiffs only purpose for bringing suit in 
the Utah courts was to circumvent his failure to comply with the statute of limitations of 
California. Id. No such facts are present here. Lastly, the Jackett court determined that 
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the public policies of Utah would not be adversely implicated upon refusing to allow suit 
under the peculiar circumstances present. Id. 1 1 
By contrast, Trillium is a Utah citizen. Record at 2, f 1. Further, unlike in Jackett, 
Trillium is not trying to resurrect a claim lost under Florida law. There is apparently no 
question that Broward County is amenable to suit with regards to the underlying matter. 
Lastly, and most importantly, acceding to Broward County's belated requests for 
immunity would be completely contrary to definite and unequivocal legislative 
expressions of public policy. The legislature has guaranteed that Utah citizens be 
afforded the right to maintain an action in the courts of Utah against those non residents 
who have minimum contacts with the state. The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted this 
statute to mandate that Utah courts exercise jurisdiction to the fullest extent permissible 
under the Constitution. Trillium is entitled to maintain this action against Broward 
County in the courts of Utah. 
1 1
 The remainder of cases previously cited by Broward County are also largely 
inapplicable. For example, in Baldwin Enterprises, Inc. v. Warwick, 545 A.2d 201 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), the decision to grant immunity from suit as a matter of 
comity turned in large part upon the existence of unsettled questions regarding New York 
laws relating to public bidding. Id at 203. In Lee v Miller County. 800 F.2d 1372, 1378 
( 5 ^ Cir. 1986), the decision to grant immunity as a matter of comity was in large part 
dependent upon the existence of a civil defense compact between counties of the two 
states and the fact that the injury complained of resulted out of operations associated with 
that civil defense compact. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's Order of Dismissal should be reversed. This Court should rule 
that Broward County is properly amenable to suit in the courts of Utah. This Court 
should remand the action for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. 
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